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his paper examines whether voters’ experience of extreme weather events such
as flooding increases voting in favor of climate protection measures. While the
large majority of individuals do not hold consistent opinions on climate issues, we
argue that the experience of natural disasters can prime voters on climate change and
affect political behavior. Using micro-level geospatial data on natural disasters, we
exploit referendum votes in Switzerland, which allows us to obtain a behavioral rather
than attitudinal measure of support for policies tackling climate change. Our findings
indicate a sizeable effect for pro-climate voting after experiencing a flood: vote-share
supporting pro-climate policies can increase by 20%. Our findings contribute to the
literature exploring the impact of local conditions on electoral behavior.
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O
ver the past three decades the salience of environmental issues has increased
significantly in the political arena. Considerable progress has been made in
addressing a variety of complex and technical problems associated with air and water
quality, genetically modified food, and the treatment of waste. However, environmental
policies continue to be difficult to implement and sell to voters in both developed and
developing countries (Bernauer and McGrath 2016). The disappointing outcomes reached
by the global environmental summits held in Johannesburg (2002) and Copenhagen
(2009), at which virtually no progress on global warming issues was made, combined
with the difficulties encountered in enforcing the Paris Agreement (2015), elucidate such
challenges.
Political progress on the climate issue typically requires electoral support, be it in the
form of supporting policies put to a direct ballot vote or via supporting politicians who
will enact such legislation. The conventional account of retrospective voting assumes that
personal experience affects political support (Fiorina 1981). There are two conflicting
views of how voters respond to events related to global warming and climate change. An
optimistic standpoint is that extreme weather events that are the consequence of global
warming are becoming more and more frequent, and hence provide the electorate with
gradually increasing and repeating concrete experiences of climate change. This view
proposes that an increase in climate-related extreme weather events can serve to shore up
support for pro-climate policies. In this view, solutions for climate change will gradually
garner majority support as the negative consequences of climate change become more
severe and occur more often. The pessimistic view is that voters are not rational but instead
short-sighted and do not possess the knowledge and ability to understand these indirect
informational updates. Thus, experiencing climate-related extreme weather events does
not change voters’ expressed political preferences, whether through voting in elections or
referendums.
In this paper, we explore whether the occurrence of an exogenous shock, such as
2
a small local natural disaster, affects political behavior. We assume that the large
majority of individuals do not hold consistent opinions on questions of climate change,
which are second order in the political debate. Personal experience provides accessible
considerations, which increase the salience of the climate issue and lead to the formation
of stronger opinions. The mechanism that we explore asks whether experiencing natural
disasters primes voters in favor of climate protection. More specifically, we expect that in
areas affected by small and local natural disaster events linked to global warming, such as
floods, voters who witness destruction become more sensitive to issues related to climate
change than those living in areas untouched by disaster. In turn, we hypothesize that areas
hit by disasters are more likely to show stronger support for pro-climate policies than
disaster-free areas.
To evaluate whether exposure to extreme weather events affects political behavior, we
rely on a database of natural disasters and ballot measures related to climate change as
well as geographical and geological variables at municipal level. These are small and
local events that cause small-to-moderate damage, such as the flooding of one street and
adjacent properties with financial damages estimated at below 1 million Swiss Francs
(about $1 million). The peculiar features of Swiss direct democracy allow us to exploit
behavioral data on repeated voting related to climate change. Thus, we are able to link
personal experience of natural disasters to actual political behavior on issues that are
closely linked to global warming and climate change. In doing so, we complement
previous studies that either test the impact of personal experience on political attitudes
that rely only on surveys (Egan and Mullin 2012) or analyze the impact of natural disasters
on voting behavior in general elections, during which environmental issues are rarely
salient (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011; Gasper and Reeves 2011).
The results show that there is a causal effect across various estimation strategies
and a number of robustness tests. The occurrence of a small and local natural disaster
event has a statistically significant positive effect on pro-climate votes. We also explore
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effect heterogeneity and show that it is larger in municipalities in which people are more
likely to be aware of the climate-extreme weather nexus. But the effect decays over
time. After ten months, outcomes in exposed and non-exposed units are indistinguishable.
The consequence of exposure on pro-climate votes is not trivial. In baseline model
specifications, the pro-climate vote share increases by 6%. Once effect heterogeneity is
taken into account, the pro-climate vote-share increases by 20%. Furthermore, we show
that exposure to floods has no effect on votes that are orthogonal to climate issues, such
as referendums on the European Union. These placebo tests corroborate the validity of
our identification strategy and highlight the significance of the main findings.
Finally, we show that natural disasters also have a positive effect on political mobiliza-
tion, which is another possible mechanism at play. In particular, we find that areas hit by
floods have higher turnout in referendums on climate measures compared to unaffected
areas. Both mechanisms, meaning the effect of floods on attitudes towards climate change
and on mobilization, point to the same key finding: the occurrence of small and local
natural disasters affects political behavior and increases support for policies that fight
global warming.
These results also contribute to ongoing debates about the value and possibilities
of using direct democratic institutions, such as the initiative and referendum. In their
recent chapter on popular control, Achen and Bartels (2017) draw a rather bleak picture
of the cognitive abilities of voters. Their argument is based on numerous studies showing
inconsistent preferences or behavior. One example is the desire for fire protection and
the public expenditure on emergency services (p. 83-85). Proponents of the opposite
position invoke work by Lupia, specifically his paper on shortcuts and heuristics (Lupia
1994). The results here, in a somewhat glass half-full or half-empty fashion, lead to a
more nuanced picture. Voters are able to process complex information, but the average
voter holds many considerations. In the short-term the Swiss voter, this analysis suggests,
seems to conform more with the optimistic picture drawn by authors like Lupia. But as
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the effect decays, the picture approaches a more grim version that might be closer to what
Achen and Bartels describe.
Literature Review
Our paper builds on two rich streams of literature in social science: personal experience
and political attitudes, as well as natural disasters and political behavior. While this
literature is too large to review fully here, below we provide a short overview of each
stream.
Personal Experience and Political Attitudes
The idea that personal experience matters for political attitudes lies at the core of the
economic voting literature (Duch and Stevenson 2006). For voters who are less politically
engaged, personal experience represents an easy and cheap way of acquiring information
that, in turn, might affect their voting behavior or, more generally, their attitudes. Here, we
take advantage of disaster data and referendum results, which allows us to study political
behavior and how it is affected when voters are exposed to extreme weather events.
Indeed, several papers link personal experience to attitudes on climate change. Stokes
(2016) finds that citizens living in proximity to wind energy projects punish the incumbent
government for its climate policy. Brody et al. (2007) note that vulnerability to floods
and rising sea levels affects the perception of risk associated with global climate change,
whereas temperature has no such impact. Recent papers explore the impact of weather
conditions on attitudes towards global warming (Egan and Mullin 2012; Konisky, Hughes,
and Kaylor 2015; Li, Johnson, and Zaval 2011; Hazlett and Mildenberger 2017). In
particular, Egan and Mullin (2012) find that an unusual increase in local temperatures
strengthens belief in global warming. Their estimates indicate the magnitude of such an
increase is substantial, though it survives only in the short-term.
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While it provides interesting results and compelling insights, we identify three
shortcomings in the existing literature. First, although Erikson and Stoker (2011) and
Egan and Mullin (2012) are important exceptions, results from previous papers are plagued
by the fact that personal experience is not randomly assigned among individuals.
Moreover, previous studies rely on surveys to capture personal experience. This
creates several well-documented problems, such as measurement error in self-reporting
and political bias in answering questions about personal experience (Bartels 2002; Achen
1975). Without linking attitudes to an exogenous shock that is likely to modify opinions
on environmental issues, it is difficult to draw conclusions from survey data based on
self-reports.
Finally, and importantly for our paper, previous studies capture attitudes towards global
warming by relying on surveys among a non-representative sample of the population (Li,
Johnson, and Zaval 2011) or a representative sample (Egan and Mullin 2012). While this
approach is surely effective in measuring political attitudes, social scientists are ultimately
interested in actual political outcomes. This is particularly important in the case of global
warming, where attitudes seem only weakly affected (if at all) by external shocks. By
exploring the impact of natural disasters on actual voting in referendums, our study is able
to show not only if external shocks change political behavior on climate ballot measures,
but also how these effects vary across units and time.
Natural Disasters and Political Behavior
There is a compelling literature that links natural disasters to political behavior. The
theoretical framework is, again, economic voting: Rational voters reward incumbents not
only for delivering positive economic performance in good times, but also for organizing
prompt rescue and relief programs in bad times, as in the case of a hurricane or major
flood.
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This literature is heavily grounded in American politics. In a pioneer study, Abney
and Hill (1966) explore voter response to the rescue program after Hurricane Betsy in
New Orleans. Chen (2012) shows that disaster relief after the Florida hurricane increased
votes for George W. Bush in the 2004 election, but only in Republican precincts. Healy
and Malhotra (2009) draw political economy implications from such findings. Since
voters reward relief programs, politicians have an incentive to invest in relief aid and
under-invest in preparedness measures. Thus, what is an electorally efficient policy turns
out to be economically sub-optimal. Finally, Gasper and Reeves (2011) show how the US
electorate rewards/punishes the requests/denials for federal assistance.1
The take-home message from this literature is two-fold. First, relief programs, if
effective, carry a sizable electoral reward for incumbents and their parties. Second, such a
reward is usually short-lived, since voters are quick to forget. This second result squares
with the literature on blind retrospective voting with the important exception of the recent
contribution by Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011). They provide the most sophisticated
analysis on the effect of natural disasters on political behavior outside the US and find
that voter gratitude lasts longer than claimed by previous studies.
These studies have convincingly shown the importance of natural disasters on voter
behavior, treating relief programs as a form of pork barrel spending in bad times.2
However, there is another channel through which natural disasters might affect (rational)
voter behavior. Given that events such as floods are associated with global warming and
climate change, voters who have directly experienced a natural disaster might form new
opinions on the salience of the climate issue. In turn, changing such opinions might shape
voting behavior on issues related to climate change. To the best of our knowledge no
1For a recent paper that addresses the impact of natural disaster on economic loss, see
Neumayer, Plümper, and Barthel (2014).
2While we do not look at the behavior of politicians there is new research indicating that
politicians respond to hurricanes in the US with more pro-climate behavior (Gagliarducci,
Paserman, and Patacchini 2018).
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study has yet explored this channel and this is where we aim to make our contribution to
the literature.
Floods and Attitudes Toward Climate Change
How do people form opinions on environmental issues? The overarching assumption
of our conceptual framework is that individuals possess multiple and often conflicting
opinions on many political questions (Zaller and Feldman 1992). The environment is a
second-order issue for the large majority of people and ranks low among the policies that
decide elections in virtually every democratic country. According to the annual Credit
Suisse Worry Barometer, the environment was not even among the top five worries of
Swiss voters in 2017.3
So how do people transform diverse considerations into closed-ended responses in
a survey or referendum on an environmental issue? We argue that people make social
judgments based on the information that is most salient or available to them. Indeed,
several scholars have previously claimed that individuals are often overly influenced by
a single dominant consideration or explanation (Shelley and Fiske 1978; Tversky and
Kahneman 1982; Rudolph and Kuhn 2018). More specifically, we argue that personal
experience serves as a focal point to form opinions on specific political issues over
which people hold different considerations. The idea that personal experience matters for
political attitudes lies at the core of the economic voting literature (Duch and Stevenson
2006). For voters who are less politically engaged, personal experience represents an easy
and cheap way of acquiring information, which, in turn, might affect their voting behavior.
In sum, we argue: 1) that a large majority of individuals do not hold consistent
opinions on climate change, which has not been particularly salient politically; 2) personal
3See https://www.credit-suisse.com/ch/de/about-us/responsibility/
dialogue/sorgenbarometer.html - accessed August 13, 2018.
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experiences provide accessible considerations, which increase the salience of climate
change and lead to the formation of opinions; 3) experiencing natural disasters that are
related to global warming primes voters in relation to climate change.4 Building on this
conceptual framework, we put forward the following testable hypothesis:
Municipalities hit by natural disasters, the occurrence of which may be linked to global
warming, are more likely to vote in favor of strict climate protection than municipalities
that do not undergo the same experience.
Data
We test our hypotheses on Switzerland for three main reasons. First, the Swiss case
provides reoccurring votes on a wide array of issues and also specifically votes on climate
measures (see e.g. Kriesi 2005; Leemann 2015). This provides us with behavioral data
and since referendums are single-issue votes, they allow us to isolate the effect of natural
disasters on climate issues from other concerns. Hence, we can test the effect of natural
disasters on a second-order issue such as climate change policies (Stadelmann-Steffen
2011). With federal or local elections, testing our hypotheses would be problematic, given
that voters care about a variety of policies, a condition which may act as a confounder,
and do not exclusively cast their votes based on the climate issue. In other words, using
referendums minimizes the measurement error.
Second, Switzerland experienced a large number of smaller and local natural disasters
during the period under investigation. In conjunction with frequent referendums on
climate-related measures, this offers the opportunity to identify the behavioral effect
4We run an original survey on 929 Swiss citizens in January 2020 and ask: “Floods,
mudslides or debris flows occur once in while. When you see how a community is hit by
such an event, do you sometimes wonder what the cause is? If so, what do you think?”.
Figure A1 in the appendix shows that about 60% of respondents mention climate change
as their response.
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rather than just a change in surveyed attitudes. Third, Switzerland has gathered very good
data on natural hazard events, easing statistical analyses. For instance, the Swiss Federal
Research Institute has been collecting data on flood and natural disaster events since 1972
(Hilker, Badoux, and Hegg 2009).
The major database we rely on is maintained by the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest,
Snow and Landscape Research (WSL) which collects all reports in local, regional, or
national newspapers of damage caused by debris flows, floods, or landslides (WSL 2012;
Andres et al. 2013). The database goes back to 1995 and we use all entries from 1995 to
2010. This data allows us to measure the natural disaster events at municipal level.
A Behavioral Measure of Climate Change Attitudes
For the behavioral measure we focus on voting behavior of villages on ballot measures
related to climate change.5 We identify a number of ballot issues that can be labeled as
environmental issues.6 But not all environmental votes are linked to climate change or
global warming.
To select specific votes, we rely on the official government information brochures that
are sent to each citizen before a vote on a referendum or initiative.7 In each brochure
we search for the following keywords to identify votes that can be connected to climate
5This is akin to the political behavior literature that analyzes aggregated attitudes and
preferences rather than the individual responses. While the individual voter may often
not appear very coherent, stable, or responsive to new circumstances, the aggregate voter
typically displays all of these characteristics (see e.g. Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).
6There is no strategic launching as a response to a flooding event. Given the rules
and regulations governing the collection of signatures and the parliamentary debate, the
process takes too long to make it possible to observe natural disaster events and then start
collecting signatures. Given that the effect is not as long-lasting, strategic timing can be
ruled out.
7The brochure contains a neutral general description of the specific measure, the main
arguments of the government, and the main arguments of the opposing side. An example
for one of the votes used here can be found at https://bit.ly/3fGlez5.
10
change: emissions, climate, air pollution, exhaust emissions, global warming, greenhouse,
and fuel consumption.8 Based on this there are nine ballot proposals for which emissions
and climate change mattered.
One vote is not included: the 2003 twin-initiative to abandon nuclear power. In
this campaign the center and center-right parties were fighting against a nuclear ban,
while the left and the ecological groups supported the ban. This is a highly unusual
case because the groups supporting stronger protection of the climate wanted to ban
nuclear power while the usual non-environmentalist groups (center, center-right, and the
government) embraced climate protection in their argument.9 While both sides used the
climate argument it was more prominent in the government’s position. The problem is
that voting for or against the issue is not a clear measure of pro-climate behavior.
Nevertheless, including the 2003 twin-initiative does not change the general inferences
– while effect size is somewhat smaller, all significance tests yield the same outcome. This
provides us with eight ballot measures from 1998 up to 2009 (see Table A11 for a full list
of all votes used). Finally, the government comprises an oversized coalition of the four
or five largest parties, which typically represent 80% or more of the citizens. Citizens
usually vote four times a year and their vote is based on party recommendations or policy
preferences. It is not unusual for a vote not to pass, and therefore the government does
not resign in such cases (Kriesi 2005).
8The German version of the information brochures was used and these are the
original keywords: Emissionen, Klima, Luftverschmutzung, Schadstoffausstoss, globale
Erwärmung, Treibhausgase, und Treibstoffverbrauch.
9The argument of non-environmentalists is that abandoning nuclear power would
make Switzerland dependent on electricity that is partly produced in German coal-fired
steam stations. Hence, relying more on this production method would increase emissions.
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Measuring Exposure
The natural disaster data gathered by the WSL includes all publicly recorded natural
disaster events. Data collection is based on more than one thousand newspapers and
magazines. The database identifies three different principal events: floods and debris
flows, rockfall, and landslides. We focus on medium and large events during the period
1995 to 2010 (Hilker, Badoux, and Hegg 2009). These are events that cause an estimated
damage of 400,000 CHF (about $400,000 or e340,000) or more.
Figure 1. Map of Swiss Municipalities Natural Disaster Events (1995-2010)
Notes: Natural disaster events (WSL, 2012). Red dots show events that occurred twelve months or
fewer prior to a vote related to climate change.
In Figure 1 all events are plotted. The red dots show the natural disaster events that
took place within the twelve months preceding a national environmental vote that was
climate-related. We use this cut-off since it allows for long effect decay. We also show
later in this paper that twelve months after a natural disaster there is no longer a difference
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between affected and non-affected municipalities (see Table 4).
These events are not independent of the topography. From Figure 1 it can be seen
that there is an impressive clustering in flat areas along lakes and at the bottom of valleys.
This is because floods and mudslides usually occur along rivers and lakes or at the bottom
of hills and mountains (e.g. Eng, Milly, and Tasker 2007).
Our unit of analysis is municipality votes. We are able to rely on more than 2,800
municipalities for each vote. Our key variable is exposure and captures whether a
municipality has been hit by a flood in the twelve months prior to a specific vote. For
each vote we include all treated and control municipalities for which data is available.
Additional Data Sources
Apart from the municipality-level ballot outcomes and the disaster database, we also
collected electoral results by municipality for all federal elections during the period (BfS
2013). In addition, we gathered numerous geographic and geological variables for all
municipalities. Two noteworthy clusters of variables are, first, the surface type in which
we have detailed information of how much area in a municipality is underbrush, artificial
(houses, lawns, parks), wetland areas, water (lakes or rivers), or forests (Swisstopo 2013).
The second relevant part is annual rainfall data per municipality from 1995 to 2011
(MeteoSwiss 2013).
Identifying the Effect
If weather and exposure to natural disaster events occurred completely at random, it would
be possible to simply compare the means of the yes vote share per municipality, and
this would provide the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) where treatment is
exposure to a disaster. However, there are good reasons to believe that natural disasters
do not occur completely at random. Villages at the bottom of a valley or at a lakeshore
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are more likely to be affected (e.g. Eng, Milly, and Tasker 2007). If well-educated people
tend to live in lakeside municipalities and hold views on climate change that differ from
the general population, the estimate would be biased.
We use two different strategies to estimate the effect of natural disaster events. We
first rely on a difference-in-differences estimator and then use entropy balancing to avoid
functional form constraints. In what follows, we first present the difference-in-differences
results based on various models with numerous control variables (Models I-III). To do
so, we use fixed effects for individual votes and individual municipalities. The variable
measuring exposure is coded as a "1" if the municipality-vote observation was affected by
a flood in the preceding twelve months, and 0 otherwise. The effect of exposure is then
the difference-in-differences estimate.
To corroborate our results, we also rely on entropy balancing to estimate the ATT with
no functional form assumptions (Model IV). Importantly, the entropy balancing balances
out observables but not unobservables. Here we can rely on an additional measure to
confront this problem. We have a risk measure (of being affected by a local natural
disaster) for each municipality and can add this to the analyses. In addition, we provide
a number of robustness tests to strengthen confidence in the empirical results. This
triangular estimation process, together with various robustness tests, provides confidence
that the causal effect is actually uncovered.
Identifying the Impact of Floods on Climate Behavior: Difference-in-Differences
A first attempt to identify the impact of a natural disaster event on voting behavior is
to compare municipalities hit by a landslide or flood with those not affected. In this
very first step we rely on a difference-in-differences estimator.Model I only includes
municipality-level party vote-shares, Model II includes a number of geographic and
surface-related variables as well as rainfall data, and Model III includes all covariates.
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We include three categories of variables to take the impact of a natural disaster event
on voting behavior into account: vote share for parties (as a proxy of the ideological
structure of a municipality), rainfall (almost always precedes a natural disaster event),
and a number of variables describing the surface. The surface is relevant to how quickly
rainfall can be absorbed and thus municipalities with large agricultural spaces, and hence
a strong farming element, could differ from those with largely uncultivated spaces that
tend to be more oriented towards tourism. Across all models the difference-in-differences
estimator is shown in the top line (labeled as flooded).
table 1 Voting and Weather (OLS)
Model I Model II Model III
exposure









Votes ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipality ✓ ✓ ✓
R2 0.82 0.84 0.85
Adj. R2 0.80 0.82 0.82
Num. obs. 21024 18320 17934
RMSE 8.18 7.62 7.61
∗∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, full table with all estimated coefficients is
presented in the appendix (Table A1)
The outcome variable in every model is the yes vote in percentage points in a
municipality. The explanatory variable of interest is exposure: whether or not a
municipality was affected by a natural disaster event in the twelve months preceding a
vote. All models indicate that there is a positive and significant effect. Depending on
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the model specification, this effect is somewhere between 0.9%-points and 1.3%-points.
As mentioned above, the estimated coefficients will only be causal estimates under rare
circumstances. The next subsection relies on an alternative identification strategy to
produce an estimate of the impact of exposure to a natural disaster event on environmental
votes related to climate change.
Identifying the Impact of Floods on Climate Behavior: Matching via Entropy Balancing
Recent contributions to the empiricist’s toolbox, namely genetic matching algorithms
(Sekhon 2011) and entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012), enable the retention of the
full sample of treated observations while still estimating the ATT. We rely on entropy
balancing as it directly achieves balance on our covariates rather than searching for weights
for the nearest neighbor and also because it is computationally far less demanding and
much faster. Finally, previous Monte Carlo simulations indicate that it performs superior
to alternatives.
Entropy balancing enables researchers to find the optimal sets of weights that produce
a perfectly balanced sample with respect to exposure. This in turn allows for the estimation
of ATT. Two sets of variables are included: first, the political parties, which reflect the
political and ideological structure of the municipality and second, an array of geographic
and climatic variables - steepness, surface structure, and rainfall.10 One problem is that
balance is only achieved on observables. In this application a known unobservable is the
actual risk of a municipality of being affected.
We know that natural disaster events are random within municipalities that share the
same risk of being affected. Ideally, we would have a perfect measure of risk and could
just compare exposed and non-exposed cases with similar risk measures. While we were
10We also included binary indicators for each ballot to ensure that we have perfect
balance on the ballots. This is important as each vote has a different overall yes share.
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Before Matching After Matching Balance
D = 1 D = 0 t-test D = 1 D = 0 t − test
Flooding Risk 0.68 0.29 0.00 0.68 0.68 ✓
Surface: % No vegetation 8.46 3.38 0.00 8.46 8.46 ✓
Surface: % Water 3.69 1.63 0.00 3.69 3.69 ✓
Surface: % Grass 31.72 44.68 0.00 31.72 31.72 ✓
Surface: % Artificial 17.51 13.16 0.00 17.51 17.51 ✓
Altitude (in m) 602.68 584.16 0.21 602.68 602.68 ✓
Rainfall (per sqkm) 1.31 2.43 0.00 1.31 1.31 ✓
Steepness in % 15.29 9.59 0.00 15.29 15.29 ✓
Social Democrats (%) 19.47 18.56 0.04 19.47 19.47 ✓
Christian Democrats (%) 23.64 16.68 0.00 23.64 23.64 ✓
Greens (%) 5.03 5.65 0.02 5.03 5.03 ✓
Liberals (%) 18.32 18.28 0.94 18.32 18.32 ✓
Swiss People’s Party (%) 25.01 27.60 0.00 25.01 25.01 ✓
working on this project, the Federal Office for the Environment (FONE) concluded a
program known as “Aquaprotect.” Together with one of the largest reinsurers (SwissRe),
the FONE created a flood model and provided risk estimations. The model is based on
grids that are 25 by 25 meters. Based on this data, we compute a risk measure for every
municipality by estimating the areas that are flood-prone within the next 50 years. In the
appendix we provide an example of the flood risk and an actual flood in the municipality
of Uerkheim; the accuracy of the measure is striking (see Figure A2). While this measure
cannot be a perfect measure, it is the closest we can get to the actual true risk of being
affected.
Since the weighted sample is balanced, the ATT is the difference in the means
of exposed and non-exposed observations. Table 2 shows the estimate as well as the
covariates and balance statistics. Entropy balancing produces a set of weights for each
observation and the ATT is estimated by regressing the pro-climate vote share on the
variable measuring exposure while using weights.
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The estimate is 2.33 percentage points, indicating that if a municipality was affected
by a natural disaster in the twelve months preceding a ballot vote, it will on average cast a
higher yes vote. This estimate is somewhat larger than the estimated coefficients in models
I, II, and III in Table 1. The ATT is 2.33 percentage points; since the average support for
pro-climate environmental ballots lies at 42.2% in our sample, a treated municipality will
on average cast about 6% more yes votes. In the next subsection we reexamine this effect
and explore whether it varies by the structure of the affected municipalities and whether
the time elapsed between vote and natural disaster matters. After that we conclude the
empirical section with a number of robustness tests.
Exploring Effect Heterogeneity
So far, we have estimated an average effect. But it is most likely not the case that this
estimate is really constant over all exposed observations (Gerber and Green 2012, p.285).
In this subsection we explore effect heterogeneity. First, we look at how the effect varies
across different types of municipalities – specifically, whether the educational structure of
a municipality is correlated with the effect size. Second, we look at how long-lasting the
effect is over time and whether or not it fades out.
Heterogeneity Across Space. The effect is the average increase in yes votes per municipality
when they are hit by a natural disaster event. The assumed underlying mechanism is
that people already hold views about the causes of climate change (Beiser-McGrath and
Huber 2018). When people are affected immediately, their climate change consideration
is activated (Zaller and Feldman 1992). This will in turn affects the decision of some
individuals, but not all.
One way to validate our assumption is to see if the effect is higher where people
are more likely to know that there is a relationship between climate change and extreme
weather phenomena. In municipalities with more people who believe that climate change
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is man-made, the effect is expected to be larger than in those municipalities where fewer
believe in the human impact on climate change. Without precise ideological measures for
municipalities or a measure of how many people believe in climate change or know how
CO2 is related to climate change, we have to use a proxy. We do not have sufficiently
detailed survey data to estimate this knowledge for each municipality in Switzerland, but
we do have detailed educational data. We use education – specifically, share of inhabitants
with a tertiary degree – to proxy for this awareness. That is, we assume that educated
people know that CO2 is related to climate change and that climate change is related to
floods.
We present here three additive models, whereas Model VI presents the interaction
effect. The outcome variable is the yes-share in a municipality. To estimate the relationship
between a municipality’s share of well-educated citizens and the size of the exposure
effect, we estimate a weighted linear regression – as in the standard set-up (see Table 2 for
more details on the entropy balancing) – with the pro-climate yes-vote share as outcome.
But rather than just including the exposure dummy we now also include the share of
well-educated citizens and the interaction.
table 3 Heterogeneity Across Municipalities
Model IV Model V Model VI
Constant 25.29∗∗∗ 17.93∗∗∗ 19.46∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.84) (0.57)
Exposure 2.33∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ −0.96
(0.72) (0.70) (1.87)
Tertiary Education Share 55.77∗∗∗ 44.15∗∗∗
(6.11) (3.69)
Exposure × Tertiary Education Share 27.11∗
(14.34)
Deviance 3613860.72 3439087.49 3428971.32
Dispersion 201.97 192.20 191.64
Num. obs. 17894 17894 17894
∗∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
In Table 3 we present the original result based on entropy balancing (Model IV).
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In Model VI the interaction effect is integrated. We run a weighted regression with
weights that achieve perfect balance between the exposed and non-exposed group
(Hainmueller 2012). The estimated parameter is significant and positive, indicating that
for municipalities with a higher share of well-educated citizens the effect is larger. For
municipalities where there are no well-educated citizens at all the effect is indistinguishable
from 0. The left panel in Figure 2 presents a visualization of this conditionality. These
results are consistent with the mechanism based on floods activating the climate change
consideration.
Heterogeneity in Time. The effect of being exposed was estimated by categorizing certain
municipalities as exposed and others as non-exposed. We defined an exposed municipality
as one affected by a natural disaster event in the twelve months leading up to a ballot vote.
Here, we explore whether the time lag between event and vote is related to the size of the
effect.
table 4 Elapsed Time and Treatment Intensity









Num. obs. 17894 17894
∗∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
To explore any such systematic effect heterogeneity, we use the balanced sample from
the entropy balancing and regress the vote outcome on exposure and elapsed time since
exposure. The first model (model IV) only includes a binary indicator whether or not a
municipality was exposed. This is the ATT based on entropy balancing since it is the
difference in means with optimal weights. The estimated ATT is presented in Table 2.
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In model VIII (Table 4) we also include the amount of time that has elapsed between
the natural disaster event and the vote taking place. Since the time variable is set to 0
for non-exposed units, this is the equivalent of the interaction of time and exposure. The
interesting result here is that the more time that lapses between, for example, a flood and
a climate sensitive vote, the smaller the effect becomes. After ten months there is no
statistical difference from an untreated unit.11 indicating that after ten months these two
(hypothetical) municipalities are indistinguishable. This is illustrated in the right panel in
Figure 2 and shows the decay of the effect over time.
We present here only the simplest functional form, but the results also hold up when
using the logarithm or other assumptions of decay. All these functional forms indicate
that the greater the passage of time between a natural disaster and a vote, the smaller the
effect.
Figure 2. Illustration of Marginal Effects























































Notes: Pseudo-Bayesian approach for uncertainty generation via sampling from the posterior
distribution. Dashed line shows 95% confidence interval.
11Even on an α level of 0.1, the confidence interval of the difference between an
exposed and non-exposed unit after ten months is covering 0. The lower bound is −.92
and the upper bound is +1.89,
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If all municipalities were affected by flooding in the week prior to a referendum, we
would on average see a yes share that is 9.4 percentage points higher. This would change
the outcome of at least one vote in our sample (that on Subsidy for renewable energies).
On average, the votes in this analysis have a vote-share of about 42.2% for the pro-climate
position. Hence, the effect increases the yes-vote share by roughly 20%.
Floods and Mobilization
We argue that exposure to a natural disaster event affects the political behavior of citizens.
The conceptual framework above is based on citizens holding conflicting considerations
when it comes to climate change. Exposure then affects the salience of pro-climate
considerations and leads to a higher share of yes votes. Another, very closely connected,
way in which exposure can affect the yes share is by affecting who turns out to vote.
Previous research has shown that the bulk of the Swiss electorate is constituted by
selective voters in referendums (Sciarini et al. 2016). Indeed, roughly 80% of voters have
participated in at least one of thirty successive direct democracy votes between 2003 and
2014 (Sciarini et al. 2016). This is in contrast to the argument put forward by Gomez,
Hansford, and Krause (2007) and Hansford and Gomez (2010), since the floods take place
months before the day of the ballot vote. But, similarly to these studies, it also relies on
differential effect on turnout for people inclined to vote in favor of climate protection.
How could natural disasters affect turnout? Here, prior work by Kriesi (2005, p.
115-121) points to two aspects that are relevant. First, by providing tangible examples of
the negative effect of global warming, natural disasters increase the probability that people
discuss climate change and share concerns about global warming. In turn, this increases
the political salience at the local level, which in turn should increase local turnout.12
12For instance, virtually every Swiss voter was aware of and participated in the
referendum on the accession to the EU market in 1992 (turnout rate of 80%), since the
22
Second, floods, which produce damage that is highly visible to the local population, help
to raise voters’ political awareness on climate change, which in turn increases turnout in
referendums locally. In the appendix we show that floods have a positive effect on turnout
and this effect holds across our main model specifications (see ??).
The main question is whether or not natural disaster events can help the climate. There
are two ways that natural disasters could affect support for climate-related ballots. First,
voters who participate and do not have clear attitudes will vote in more climate-friendly
ways after experiencing a local natural disaster. Second, voters who are close to indifferent
about whether to participate in a vote actually turn out after witnessing a local natural
disaster. While our data’s strength is that it captures actual behavior, its weakness is that
one cannot actually adjudicate between these two mechanisms.
Robustness Checks
We present here a number of robustness checks related to our main analysis. The checks are
formulated in the following subsections, and the actual tables are relegated to the appendix.
We carry out four additional robustness tests. First, we create an exposure variable for
units that were affected right after a vote. This allows us to illustrate that our main findings
are neither spurious nor due they reflect an anticipatory effect. Second, we estimate
identical models on three environmental votes that were unrelated to climate change.
Third, we reestimate the same models on votes related to Switzerland’s relationship to the
European Union. Forth, we include a measure for whether a municipality was close to an
affected municipality. Across all models we find consistent results.
issue was perceived as being of utmost importance for the country (Kriesi et al. 1993).
Participation was about twice as large as regular participation rates.
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Future Exposure
The first robustness check relies on an alternative exposure variable - municipalities are
coded as treated if they experienced a local natural disaster in the twelve months after a
vote. In the lead variable, a municipality is not counted as treated if it was hit before a
vote but we code it as treated if it was hit after a vote. Since the disaster event is actually
after the vote, there should be no effect. This allows a first check of the robustness of
our findings. In a second step we can also add the regular exposure variable and rule out
anticipatory effects (Malani and Reif 2015). If we find a significant effect for the lead
variable, that would suggest the presence of anticipation which would (partly) refute our
argument. We do not find any significant lead effect of natural disasters on pro-climate
political behavior across all models (see Table A3 and Table A4). Importantly, the
coefficient of our exposure variable remain positive and significant. This increases the
credibility of the presented results.
Placebo Test: Environmental Votes Not Related to Climate Change
An additional robustness test can be performed by reestimating our models on other
environmental votes. During the period studied, three other votes were held that were
related to the environment but not climate. Two votes in 2003 were on nuclear power
plants (one demanded a ban on new nuclear power plants and the other demanded the
slow phasing-out of nuclear power) and one vote in 2008 sought to ban military fighter
jet training in recreation areas due to noise. The discussion surrounding the two nuclear
power plants was based on arguments about the safety of nuclear power (implying support
for a ban of nuclear power plants) and the economic costs of such a ban (implying
opposition to the ban). The two main arguments against the ban were the loss of jobs and
expected price hikes (Blaser et al. 2003). All three votes were strongly supported by the
Green party but climate change arguments were not a relevant part of the debate on the
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pro or on the contra side.
We reestimated the effect with both strategies (difference-in-differences and entropy
balancing) and show the results in the appendix (see Table A5 and Table A6). We estimate
the models on data from these three votes which are not related to climate change. All
estimated effects are not distinguishable from 0, as we would expect.
Placebo Test: Non-Environmental Votes
The final robustness test relies on seven votes about the relationship between the European
Union and Switzerland. These votes are unrelated to climate change and represent yet
another way of assessing the robustness of the results. These votes also tap into the
second dimension but represent a more salient issue (Linder and Mueller 2017; Kriesi
et al. 2005). We re-estimate the models and find across all specifications no effect (see
Table A8 and Table A9). This further increases the confidence in the main findings.
Surrounding Municipalities
A an additional robustness check involves adding information on other municipalities that
are close to the flooding events. We add a covariate that captures whether a municipality is
close to an affected municipality and use different cutoffs: 2, 4, and 8 km. The substantive
results do not change as the estimates remain virtually unchanged. We present this analysis
in Table A10 and the original estimates remain unchanged.
Summary of Empirical Results
The last couple of sections show that across a number of different empirical models
there is a clear positive effect – the pro-climate voting share is significantly higher in
municipalities recently affected by local extreme weather events. This effect also changes
depending on time or educational structure, as expected. The robustness section serves to
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increase confidence in the identified effect here. It does so by showing that the effect is
not found when coding future events as past events or when relying on votes where there
should not be an effect.
The effect sizes in models I-VI are moderate as the average effect is averaged over the
events in the data. But in model VIII we estimate the decay of the effect and see that an
event a week before a vote increases the yes-vote share by 9.4 percentage points, which is
a sizable effect that would have changed the outcome of at least one of the votes under
consideration here. In addition, the pro-climate vote share is on average 42.2%, which
implies that being affected right before a vote will increase the yes vote share by about
20%.
The argument here is that these small and local events serve as information and make
more salient the pro-climate consideration when the individual decides on how to or
whether to cast a ballot. Apart from the effect decay, there is also a second verification that
must hold. Municipalities with a higher share of people likely to hold the consideration
at all should show a larger effect. To test this, we model the effect size as a function of
the share of population with a tertiary education. We find again a strong correlation.
Based on a model, we can compare the expected effect of a municipality where 7% have
a tertiary degree (tenth percentile) with another where that share is at 22% (ninetieth
percentile). The effect increases by 4 percentage points. This is a large effect. Overall,
the estimation shows a robust causal effect and the correlations of effect size and two
theoretically motivated variables support the argument. Voter behavior is affected by
living in an area recently hit by a local extreme weather event.
Conclusion
This paper started out with the question of whether popular support for climate protection
is likely to increase with the rate of extreme weather events. Based on geo-coded data
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on small and local natural disasters, we measure the behavioral effect. We show that
municipalities affected before a ballot vote display significantly higher vote shares. But
the effect size is dependent on how close in time these events occur and how many people
may even hold such considerations.
The results have direct implications for climate policy and also speak to debates about
the efficiency of direct democratic institutions. The decay of the effect within a year is
sobering as it is unlikely that the current increase in extreme weather is sufficient to bring
about a substantial political change within the electorate. At the same time, these results
show that there is a window of opportunity after such small and local events during which
voters are more sensitive to questions of climate change. One immediate question coming
out of this is how pro-climate organizations can seize this window of opportunity.
Based on prior theoretical models of beliefs regarding climate change and its conse-
quences, we also explore effect heterogeneity as a function of education to proxy for the
awareness of the climate change and extreme weather mechanism. These results are more
encouraging for environmental groups. If the proxy variable actually captures knowledge
of the link between climate change and extreme weather, one direct implication is to
further educate the public. The effect size is extremely strong.
Finally, our paper speaks to the question of voter competence and whether average
citizens use direct democratic institutions in a coherent way (Achen and Bartels 2017).
The results support the argument that citizens’ behavior changes in the expected direction
after they experience a local event. While it is possible to judge whether beliefs are correct
or not, we cannot do the same in a liberal democracy with attitudes or behavior. However,
one can investigate whether there is consistent behavior showing that informational
updates affect the behavior of at least some citizens. Of interest here is the heterogeneity
in the effect. The effect is driven in part by the ability to link, for example, local flooding
with climate change. In municipalities with a higher share of well-educated citizens the
increase in pro-climate voting is most pronounced. At the same time, these effects fade
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out over time. This shows that there is consistency in behavior but this does not apply to
the entire citizenry and is limited to the aftermath of events.
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